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Abstract
Indian parliament is getting ready to debate the National Food Security Bill 
that would be the single biggest poverty alleviation programme, costing about 
1.5 per cent of India's gross domestic product. There has been a ﬁerce debate 
leading up to the drafting of the bill and subsequent modiﬁcations. This article 
ﬁrst points out the salient features of the Indian economy to give context to 
assess the current debate. In particular, it gives a detailed picture of the grain 
market in India and the important role played in it by the central government. 
It traces the path of the bill from its genesis through the subsequent debate and 
political process. The article identiﬁes the key players in the debate and the 
role they have played in shaping the provisions in the latest draft of the bill. 
At the end, the authors speculate about likely food security outcomes in India.
Keywords: food subsidy, in-kind transfers, cash transfers, corruption, information 
technology
Introduction
India, a country known for its sharp contrasts, is growing at 8 per cent 
per year even in this post ﬁnancial crisis period while poverty has 
declined only modestly. Over the two decades from 1983 to 2004, the 
head count measure of poverty dropped less than 20 percentage points 
(from 45 per cent to 27 per cent). More alarmingly, the population 
subsisting under twice the Indian poverty line (approximately US$2 a 
day at 1999 prices) barely came down, from 86 per cent to 80 per cent 
(Kotwal, Ramaswami & Wadhwa 2011). As the aspirations rise among 
the top economic tiers of the society, so does the level of frustration of 
those left behind. The governments at both the central and state level 
therefore feel compelled to try out different palliatives to poverty. The 
two largest poverty alleviation programmes of the central government 
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are the National Food Security Bill and the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act. What is unique about these two 
initiatives is that they confer on each Indian household legal rights to 
food and employment—an ambitious step for a country as large and 
poor as India. Both measures can be regarded as different means of in-
come transfer to the poor. This paper will analyze speciﬁcally the debate 
over the proposed National Food Security Bill as well as the political 
economy of the process that is shaping it. The bill has been introduced 
in the parliament and a parliamentary standing committee has been set 
up to receive feedback from all interested parties. The bill is likely to be 
debated during the monsoon session (2012) of the parliament and this 
is an opportune time to undertake such an analysis. 
Salient Features of the Course of Development in India
To be able to judge the merits of various arguments in the debate and 
to appreciate the political economy underlying them, it is important to 
note a few salient features of the structure of the Indian economy as well 
as of the growth path it has travelled over the last three decades. 
Informal Economy
First, almost 92 per cent of India's labour force makes a living in the 
informal sector that is comprised of small units of one to nine people. 
Twenty-six per cent of India's population is still illiterate and most of 
those who work in the informal sector have an educational level below 
eighth grade. Many of them have no school certiﬁcate, no bank account, 
no record of house ownership, no tax records or any ofﬁcial identity 
cards that would give them a direct connection with the government 
administration. Any poverty alleviation scheme is vulnerable to corrup-
tion as the poor have very weak political power. This leaves scope for 
intermediaries to siphon off funds targeted to the poor. It is unrealistic 
to expect sustained political pressure from this politically weak section 
of the society for efﬁcient delivery of welfare. It is instructive to note that 
in 2004–2005, the income transfer to the poor accounted for only 10 per 
cent of the cost of food subsidies (Jha & Ramaswami 2012). 
Uneven Growth
Second, the rapid growth of the last three decades has been spearheaded 
by a few skill-intensive sectors such as software and business services, 
which unfortunately absorb little unskilled labour directly. There has 
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been some trickle down through increased demand in sectors such as 
trade, transportation and construction. But employment for low-skilled 
workers has grown at a much slower rate than income, exacerbating 
the existing inequalities. (Eswaran, Kotwal, Ramaswami & Wadhwa 
2009). Since the growth process itself is not resulting in a rapid decline 
in poverty, the case for well-funded poverty alleviation programmes 
meets very little direct political resistance.1 In fact, the expenditure on 
poverty programmes can be regarded as a side payment from the rich 
to the poor to compensate partly for unequal growth that could create 
political unrest. The debate is therefore not about whether to fund in-
come transfers to the poor but rather how to do it.
Transfers to the Poor to Build Human Capital
It is easy to see that the demographic dividend that India is ex-
pected to reap over the next few decades will not amount to much 
if the new generation is malnourished and undereducated; the eco-
nomic future very much depends upon the human capital of the 
next generation. All political parties therefore accept the need for 
efforts to boost the nutritional and educational levels of the poor. 
In fact, the food share of total consumption expenditures has declined 
since 1983 for all income groups in India. Nutritional levels (intake of 
calories, protein and micro-nutrients) have also dropped for all income 
groups between 1983 and 2004 (Paul 2011). Some people have seen this 
as a sign of impoverishment of the masses (Patnaik 2007, 2010) while 
others (Deaton & Dreze 2009; Banerjee & Duﬂo 2011) have tried to ex-
plain it in terms of consumer choices in the context of environmental 
changes (e.g., fewer calories needed as a result of growth in infrastruc-
ture). There may be legitimate reasons for a decline in calorie intake but 
a fall in nutritional standards is indeed of concern.
One practical problem here is that it is exceedingly difﬁcult for soci-
ety to make sure that the poor use the aid they receive for the intended 
purpose of nutrition. For example, if food is sold at subsidized prices, it 
is quite possible that they spend the savings thus incurred on something 
other than food. This need not be a frivolous expenditure. Every house-
hold has its own priorities and if a particular household decides to buy 
a cell phone instead of improving their food basket, it may very well 
be that they feel a stronger need for that phone than for more calories. 
In short, there is a limit to the control that a society can exercise over 
individual lives (Banerjee & Duﬂo 2007, 2011).
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Farmers' Welfare as a Consideration
Governments all over the world worry not just about the consumption 
of the poor but also about 'food security' for the country, which includes 
incentives to food producers. Even the proposed bill is named the 
National Food Security Bill. Any intervention in the food market must 
therefore safeguard the interests of the consumers as well as the produc-
ers of food. In India, consumers have always been subsidized partly at 
the expense of farmers through policies such as levies for sugar and rice 
and periodic export bans on rice and wheat. Farmers have gradually 
acquired greater voice and we see this reﬂected in a steady rise in the 
Minimum Support Price (MSP) for food grains. Yet, there continues to 
be an export ban on rice and the domestic price of rice is kept much 
lower than the international price. In addition, a signiﬁcant part of the 
informal sector is agriculture. Many of the poor are thus farmers and if 
policy-makers try to subsidize poor consumers by forcing the market 
price down, it would not have the impact on poverty they desired. Food 
price suppression hurts the farmers with large surpluses to sell. While 
these are not likely to be poor, a depressed agricultural economy offers 
weak demand for the only asset the rural poor have—their physical 
labour. 
Public Distribution System
The Public Distribution System (PDS), a remnant of the rationing system 
from the Second World War years, is the present vehicle for deliver-
ing food subsidies in India. The Food Corporation of India (FCI), set 
up in 1965 as a government agency to procure food grains,2 has the 
responsibility to procure food grains and to distribute them to state 
governments for the ultimate distribution to consumers through select 
retail outlets known as 'fair price shops'. Until 1997, the PDS coverage 
was universal but since then the PDS has targeted certain categories of 
households, labelled 'Above Poverty Line' (APL), 'Below Poverty Line' 
(BPL) and 'Poorest of the Poor' (POP). Eligible beneﬁciaries receive 35 
kg of food grains at subsidized rates with the lowest level of subsidy 
to APL households and the highest to POP households. The level of 
subsidy in 2009–2010 was such that APL households could buy wheat 
at around 40 per cent of the market price, BPL households at around 
26 per cent of the market price, and POP households paid about 13 per 
cent of the market price. Similar ﬁgures for rice were 51 per cent, 36 per 
cent and 19 per cent respectively.3  
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The large gaps between the subsidized prices and market prices con-
stitute an incentive for intermediaries in the supply chain (including the 
fair price shop owner) to illegally divert the subsidized grain to the mar-
ket and thereby proﬁt from arbitrage. Consequently, a signiﬁcant part 
of the allotment ends up on the open market while ration cardholders 
are turned away with the excuse that the shop is sold out of subsidized 
grain. In 2004–2005, about 54 per cent of subsidized grain was estimated 
to be lost in this manner (Jha & Ramaswami 2012). For 2009–2010, the 
estimate is 40 per cent (Ramaswami & Murugkar 2012). 
Targeting is a formidable problem in India. As a result, a large number 
of the poor are excluded from coverage; they are simply not on the list. In 
addition, a sizeable portion of the eligible poor do not participate in the 
programme for various reasons such as lacking enough cash to purchase 
the monthly rations all at once. According to Jha and Ramaswami (2012), 
only about 30 per cent of the poor derive some beneﬁt from the PDS.4
The PDS requires the government (through the FCI) to run the entire 
system to procure grain, store it and distribute it. The government opera-
tions are more costly than the private sector as evidenced by the fact that 
the market price is a little lower than the 'economic cost' of procuring, 
storing and transporting it to state government warehouses.5  
Figure 1 shows the waste and inefﬁciency of the PDS as calculated 
in Jha and Ramaswami (2012). Only 10 per cent of the food subsidy 
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FIGURE 1. Decomposition of Food Subsidy Expenditures
Source:  Jha & Ramaswami (2012)
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expenditure ends up as an income transfer to the poor. Seventy-one per 
cent of the subsidy expenditure is lost because of corruption and the 
excess cost of government agencies. Clearly, the PDS is an expensive 
(and weak) mechanism for income transfer to the poor. 
The Inﬂuence of the PDS on the Market Prices of Food Grains
Jha and Ramaswami (2012) estimate that in 2004–2005, about 70 per 
cent of the poor were excluded from the beneﬁts of the PDS and had 
no option but to buy grain on the open market. Thus, market prices 
crucially affect the well-being of the poor. Therefore, in order to be 
able to assess the impact of the PDS on the welfare of the poor, we also 
need to understand how the existence of the PDS inﬂuences the market 
prices of food grains. 
The government is an overwhelmingly large player in India's grain 
market. In 2010–2011, the government procured almost half of the mar-
keted surplus (Economic Advisory Council 2011).6 It is not difﬁcult to 
imagine therefore that the behaviour of private traders is heavily inﬂu-
enced by the procurement decisions of the government. To understand 
this process in detail, let us ﬁrst see how the grain market functions in 
India. Since the operations of rice procurement are slightly more compli-
cated than that of wheat procurement, we will illustrate our arguments 
by examining the wheat market.7  
The government (through the FCI) is obliged to buy all the grain that 
anyone wants to sell at the pre-announced support price. After the har-
vest, the government as well as private traders are in the market procur-
ing grain. As long as the government operations continue, the support 
TABLE 1:  Support Prices and Procurement: 2001–2002 to 2010–2011
Year
 Minimum Support Price
(in Rs. per quintal)
Amount of Procurement 
(Million tons)
2001–2002 580 20.6
2002–2003 610 19.0
2003–2004 630 15.8
2004–2005 630 16.7
2005–2006 640 14.7
2006–2007 700 9.2
2007–2008 850 11.1
2008–2009 1,000 22.6
2009–2010 1,080 25.3
2010–2011 1,100 22.5
Source:  Food Corporation of India – the support prices include the bonus announced for that year. 
Available from: http://fciweb.nic.in.
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price is the market price. A trader's margins come from the difference 
between expected future prices and the support price. When the gov-
ernment maintains large stocks, future prices are unpredictable. What 
if the government ofﬂoads its stocks?  A feared export ban and other 
restrictions on private trading activity have similar effects. As a result, 
private traders withdraw from the market. The government does not 
have this option and is bound to purchase all that is offered for sale at 
the support price. The result is that the government procurement (and 
stocks) increase even more than they would have otherwise (i.e., if the 
initial level of stocks were low). 8
Table 1 shows how the support price and the procurement for wheat 
have moved over the last decade. From 2001–2002 to 2006–2007, the sup-
port price increased by 20 per cent. Then things changed dramatically. In 
2007–2008, the support price increased by 21 per cent and the following 
year by another 18 per cent. This is the period during which world food 
prices peaked. India responded by closing off exports to world markets 
and by hiking support prices so that it could procure enough to maintain 
supply to the PDS. Some observers have maintained that the sharp hikes 
in support prices were populist policies aimed at garnering support 
from the farm lobby in a parliamentary election year (2009). This fails 
to explain the modest movement in support prices during the ﬁrst half 
of the decade: a period that also saw parliamentary elections (in 2004). 
The explanation also does not square with the export bans and with the 
imports of wheat during this period at prices higher than those granted 
to domestic producers. A more consistent explanation is the govern-
ment's overriding commitment to the PDS, which in turn derives from 
the perception that a failure here would be costly electorally. 
What is surprising is that this situation has continued until now. 
Why has the government not undertaken open market sales to bring 
the price down, especially during this period of inﬂationary concerns? 
One plausible explanation is that the government machinery is simply 
not set up to sell the excess inventory on the open market. To do so, 
the FCI would have to receive permission from the Food Ministry as 
well as the Ministry of Finance, especially if they had to sell at less than 
their 'economic costs', i.e., at a nominal loss. In other words, although 
'price stabilization' has been one of their primary objectives, they have 
no streamlined administrative procedures to sell in a timely manner to 
achieve it. Over the years, the FCI has been quick to buy but unable to 
divest itself systematically of unwanted stocks, thus leading to embar-
rassing high stock levels. 
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Thus, the combined effect of excess procurement of grain and the gov-
ernment's inability to dispose of excess stocks results in the unintended 
consequence of a rise in the market price of food, inﬂicting pain on the poor 
who have no choice but to buy on the open market. This leads to hunger 
amidst abundance. It is a peculiar outcome that while the government 
focuses on its supply commitments to the PDS, it is not nearly as focused 
on the consequences of its actions on market prices and on the poor.9 
An interesting question is, if the government is so committed to the 
PDS, why has it allowed it to become so dysfunctional? Why doesn't 
the government put more effort into improving administration and 
reducing waste and corruption? The answer perhaps lies in the divided 
responsibility of the central and state governments. The central gov-
ernment feels political pressure to maintain supplies to the PDS. The 
corruption and waste that impede delivery can possibly be deﬂected to 
state governments and local administration. 
Implications of the PDS for Farmers
First, it is important to note that India's domestic food grain market is 
somewhat shielded from ﬂuctuations in the international market. For 
example, the international rice price is much higher today than that in 
the domestic market but the international wheat price is lower than in 
the domestic market. Indian farmers are protected from the volatility 
in the international markets but are denied the opportunity to sell on 
the international markets through export bans. This has been the case 
throughout India's post-Independence history and it is likely to remain 
so for the foreseeable future due to the government's commitment to 
food subsidies.
Food subsidy through the PDS is a big cost item. Food subsidies equal 
about 1 per cent of India's GDP and about 8.25 per cent of the non-plan 
expenditure budget of the central government. These numbers may see 
a quantum jump of 50 per cent in the year 2013 when the National Food 
Security Bill will be put to vote. If the domestic prices were allowed to 
ﬂuctuate as much as international prices, the government would have 
to have a massive reserve fund to accommodate the ﬂuctuations in the 
budgetary provisions for food subsidies and we suspect that the Finance 
Ministry is not going to be willing to do it.
Coarse Grain Farmers 
In all discussions of food price policy, it is customary to talk about 
'farmers' as if they were one homogenous group with common inter-
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ests. However, in the context of the PDS in India, this is certainly not 
the case. 
The FCI procures wheat, rice and coarse grains (jowar, bajra, maize 
and ragi) for distribution through the PDS. But the coarse grains are a 
marginal item in PDS. For example, in 2010, 22.5 million tons of wheat, 
34.1 million tons of rice and 0.4 million tons of coarse grains were pro-
cured. It is fair to say that PDS is a system to distribute mostly subsidized 
wheat and rice to the whole country. This keeps domestic prices high 
for farmers who grow wheat and rice and partially compensates for the 
government policy to maintain export bans. Out of the total procurement 
of 22.5 million tons of wheat in 2010, 10.2 million tons were procured 
from the state of Punjab, 6.3 million tons from Haryana, 3.5 million tons 
from Madhya Pradesh and 1.6 million tons from Uttar Pradesh. Punjab 
and Haryana supply the bulk of the PDS requirements for wheat. For 
rice, the distribution is a little less concentrated. Out of the total procure-
ment of 341 million tons of rice, the state of Andhra Pradesh supplied 
90 million tons, Punjab 85 million tons, Uttar Pradesh 40 million tons, 
Chattisgarh and Orissa 28 million tons each, West Bengal 17 million 
tons, Haryana 14 million tons and Bihar 10 million tons. The lion's share 
comes from Andhra Pradesh and Punjab.
In several states such as Karnataka, Maharashtra and Rajasthan, coarse 
grains are important staples. These coarse grains are typically cultivated 
in arid areas where the soil is of a low quality; the farmers are poor. 
When the PDS sells subsidized wheat and rice, it has a dampening ef-
fect on the coarse grain prices. Coarse grain farmers in these areas are 
short-changed by the PDS. Last year over 50,000 farmers from the state 
of Maharashtra signed a letter to the prime minister requesting a reap-
praisal of the PDS. This shows that some farmers are not happy with the 
PDS and that different states have different preferences when it comes 
to the means of delivering food subsidies. For example, in Maharashtra, 
where jowar and bajra are main staples, if the FCI ﬁnds it unwieldy to 
procure coarse grains, the state government might prefer to give cash 
transfers. Consumers could then spend it on their preferred staples, in 
turn giving a boost to the local farmers. Given the regional diversity in 
India, this sort of ﬂexibility in government policy is crucial.
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Main Players in the Political Economy of Food Subsidy
State Governments
Once a state has received its allotment of grain, it is the state's responsi-
bility to distribute it. While thinking about the political economy of food 
security, we must consider the state governments' role in determining 
the outcome.
Right to Food Campaign 
In recent years, the main responsibility for political action on behalf of 
the poor has been taken up by civil society (i.e., the NGOs). Unhappy 
with the poor performance of the public distribution system and the 
lack of political interest, some civil society organizations have pushed to 
embed food security in the legal framework and secure some degree of 
state commitment. In 2001, the People's Union of Civil Liberties ﬁled a 
public interest petition in the Supreme Court of India demanding judi-
cial oversight of the food intervention by individual states. They argued 
that the right to food derives from the right to life that is guaranteed 
by the Constitution. The case is still ongoing. However, the Supreme 
Court has been sympathetic to the petition indicated by the wide range 
of directives it has issued so far.  
An informal network of individuals and organizations has organized 
around the public interest litigation to campaign for a right to food. 
The Right to Food campaign has pressed for a range of interventions 
beyond just food programmes, such as public works programmes, 
public services for nutrition, health and education for young children, 
and securing equitable land and forest rights. The willingness of the 
judiciary to adjudicate on these issues has provided sustenance to this 
movement. 
National Advisory Council
Since 2005, the Indian parliament has legislated several highly progres-
sive acts (e.g., Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guaran-
tee Act (2005), Right to Information Act (2005) and Right to Education 
(2010)), and now it is getting ready to introduce the National Food Se-
curity Bill (or the Right to Food Act) in the next parliamentary session. 
All of these legislative acts were conceived in the National Advisory 
Council (NAC) set up by the present prime minister to carry out the 
mandate of the Common Minimum Programme announced by the 
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) which refers to the present ruling 
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coalition at the centre made up of Congress Party and its allies. Sonia 
Gandhi, who is the president of the Congress Party and the Chair of 
the National Advisory Council, is widely regarded as the driving force 
behind the government decisions. 
Passage of an act legally requires the government to carry out the act, 
and NGOs take it upon themselves to make sure that it does. Thus, these 
acts are created to arm the civil society organizations with tools to hold the 
government accountable and are a testimony to the new-found power of 
the civil society. This has been possible because Mrs. Gandhi has invited 
many high proﬁle social activists to the NAC and they have been driving 
the agenda. For the ﬁrst time, the poor have acquired a strong voice in 
creating legislation. But how has it affected the outcome? 
NAC membership has infused Indian policy making with renewed 
idealism that had eroded over the post-Independence period. However, 
idealism seldom comes without an ideological bias. The social activ-
ists in the NAC have come to believe that the market seldom works in 
favour of the poor and therefore distrust it. Perhaps their bitter experi-
ence with the inﬂuence of business interests over government actions 
and the indifference of the Indian rich toward the plight of the poor 
have made them deeply suspicious of any market-oriented solution to 
poverty problems. 
Central Government (Cabinet)
The NAC was created to put forth a progressive social agenda that would 
reﬂect the Common Minimum Programme announced by the Congress 
Party in May 2004. Its mandate is to draft legislation that would reﬂect 
the agenda. The operational wing of the government, namely the cabinet 
and the central bureaucracy, must concern themselves with the practical 
aspects of the suggested legislative agenda–whether the government has 
the wherewithal to make it work or the ﬁnancial resources to do it, and 
must balance the additional ﬁscal burden against equally pressing needs. 
In the speciﬁc case of the National Food Security Bill, the government 
found NAC's recommendations unaffordable. This is understandable 
as the cost of executing the NAC's draft proposal would have exceeded 
2 per cent of India's GDP. In comparison, the total health expenditure 
by the central and state governments is only about 1 per cent of GDP, 
and education expenditure is only 3-4 per cent. The Food Security Bill 
is undoubtedly a costly item and it is easy to see why the government 
would try to whittle down the recommendations of the NAC. In addi-
tion, the government would face logistical and infrastructural problems 
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if the total amount of grain to be procured and distributed goes up 
dramatically. For all these positions, the government position has been 
more conservative than that of the NAC.
It is important to remember that the sector that has spearheaded India's 
economic growth over the last two decades has been the information 
technology (IT) sector. It is one area where Indian industry has shone in 
international competition. It is not a surprise therefore that the govern-
ment has come to have some faith in solutions based on IT. Last year the 
government announced an ambitious scheme to give each willing Indian 
citizen a Unique Identiﬁcation number (UID) with biometric identiﬁca-
tion. This would give some ofﬁcial identity to millions of Indians who 
have none in this informal economy. It will create direct links between 
the central government and an individual citizen and thus facilitate direct 
transfer of resources to individuals and bypass the siphoning off by cor-
rupt ofﬁcials. The government has appointed an ex-CEO of the software 
giant Infosys to a position with a cabinet rank to lead this initiative. It is 
clear that the government is serious about the UID programme. It is a 
fair guess that the government would be equally serious about any tech-
nological solution that UID would facilitate, such as cash transfers.
Fair Price Shopkeepers' Lobby
It is true that selling subsidized grain on the open market can be a very 
proﬁtable business and licenses for these fair price shops are a means of 
patronage by politicians. We can imagine that these shopkeepers would 
not want to see the PDS replaced by a system of cash transfers or some 
other alternative. However, this lobby must exert its inﬂuence through 
its internal dealings, which are not observable, and we will therefore 
not comment further on this lobby.
Debate over the Food Security Bill
Over the last year or so, there has been a ﬁerce debate in the media 
over the provisions of the National Food Security Bill. On one side are 
the social activists associated with the Right to Food campaign, who 
are also well represented in the NAC. The main demands by the Right 
to Food campaign activists are: universal or near universal coverage 
to minimize the exclusion of the truly needy, a continuation of the in-
kind transfer system through the PDS (albeit a reformed version), and 
auxiliary programmes such as cooked meals for pregnant women, the 
destitute and the homeless. 
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On the other side of the debate, however, is not the political right who 
are ideologically opposed to any government transfer programmes; 
rather, it is mainstream economists and other commentators who are 
arguing about the means rather than the ends of delivering food subsi-
dies. Even when agreeing with the case for near-universal coverage of 
a food subsidy system, many economists have observed that it would 
be a mistake for the government to be bound to the PDS. The staggering 
inefﬁciency of the distribution system means that alternatives including 
cash transfers must be tried. The government (i.e., the Cabinet) does 
not participate directly in the public debate but makes its presence felt 
through other means, such as appointing expert committees to review 
the recommendations of the NAC.
The case for near universal coverage is logically sound. In an informal 
economy such as India's, it is far easier to identify the well-to-do than 
the poor. Also, when 78 per cent of the population lives under US$2 a 
day at purchasing power parity (PPP), it is hardly worth sorting out 
who is under US$1 a day (that is, the BPL population) and who is above. 
The only reason that the government has balked at conceding the near 
universal coverage is the cost and procurement difﬁculties that it cannot 
handle. This is especially so if the subsidy has to be delivered through 
the cumbersome and wasteful vehicle of the PDS. In some ways, the 
insistence of the social activists to continue with in-kind transfers has 
turned out to be counter-productive to its demand of universal or near 
universal coverage to minimize the exclusion of the truly needy. 
The NAC ﬂoated its ﬁrst draft proposal, which stopped short of near 
universal coverage and recommended 75 per cent coverage with 35 kgs 
to each BPL household at 2 rupees (Rs.) per kg for wheat and Rs. 3 per 
kg for rice. The government set up an expert committee to assess the 
NAC recommendations. The committee had among its members the 
principal economic advisor to the central government as well as some 
prominent civil servants. The committee recommended that the cover-
age be reduced from 75 per cent to 46 per cent and cited procurement 
difﬁculties and cost. The Expert Committee also mentioned alternatives 
to the PDS such as smart cards, food stamps or cash transfers as some-
thing to strive for in the future, although the suggestion was thrown in 
almost as an afterthought. Though the committee report's arguments 
and its calculations of costs were based on the assumption that food 
subsidies would be delivered through the PDS, the offhand comment 
about cash transfers evoked a rebuke from the Right to Food activists 
(Hindu, 3 August 2011). The reduction of coverage was criticized not 
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only by the activists but also more neutral commentators and academics 
(Indian Express, 19 January 2011; Hindustan Times, 29 February 2012) who 
argued that the coverage would not have to be reduced if the costly PDS 
were replaced by cash transfers or some other alternative. 
At this point, the NAC invited feedback from the public on their 
draft and indeed there was some debate in the public media on both 
issues—the coverage and whether cash transfers should replace in-kind 
transfers. A group of scholars sympathetic to the Right to Food cam-
paign argued that a few experiments to reform the PDS were showing 
signs of success and it would be a mistake to replace the PDS with an 
untried system of cash transfers (Ghosh 2011; Khera 2011). The debate 
was joined by other economists who felt that cash transfers deserved 
a chance (Kotwal, Murugkar & Ramaswami 2011; Roy Chaudhuri & 
Somanathan 2011). Two examples of successful reforms were in the 
states of Chattisgarh and Tamil Nadu. In both cases, the coverage was 
near universal and IT was used to trace every shipment of grain from 
a warehouse to a designated shop so that any diversion could be de-
tected. There was also an emphasis on using community awareness to 
watch for local corruption, for example through social audits. In fact, 
organizing the local community to check corruption is what appeals 
philosophically to the Right to Food group.
One signiﬁcant entry into the debate was an open letter to Mrs. Gan-
dhi signed by 45 Indian economists, in India as well as abroad, urging 
that coverage be kept near universal and not to preclude experiments 
with alternatives to the PDS (Economic Times 2011a). Their argument 
was based on the fact that India was a large and diverse country and 
if each state can experiment with a system that suits them best, good 
solutions would evolve. In the meantime, the state of Bihar has already 
started pilot projects using cash transfers. Their BPL count exceeds that 
of the central government and this extra subsidy comes from Bihar's 
own resources. This allows them some latitude to experiment. 
There are several things about a switch to cash transfers that worries 
the Right to Food group. They believe that the technological infrastruc-
ture necessitated by cash transfers would be attractive to the corporate 
sector and government policy would be hijacked. They also believe 
that the poor would be short-changed by a switch to cash transfers as 
the government would not change the amount of the cash subsidy in 
response to a change in grain prices. As a larger philosophical issue, 
they prefer solutions to social problems based on collective action by 
the local community rather than technological solutions, as shown by 
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their opposition to the UID project. We will discuss this in the next 
section.
The NAC came back with a ﬁnal draft four months later that did not 
deviate much from their preliminary draft in terms of the coverage and 
insistence on the PDS. The draft did not mention alternatives to the PDS 
and left little scope for states to experiment. The open letter to Mrs. 
Gandhi did not seem to have had any impact on the NAC. The draft 
recommended supervision even over tasks that were the responsibilities 
of state governments. The draft also contained vague and uncontrover-
sial recommendations to improve agricultural productivity, which had 
not ﬁgured in the debate. 
The NAC draft was handed over to the Expert Committee of Minis-
ters, a sub-committee of the Cabinet, which modiﬁed the NAC draft. 
The revised draft raised another storm of protests from the Right to 
Food group. Predictably, the government reduced the coverage from 
the level recommended by the NAC and introduced the possibility of 
cash transfers. The government was not only going to allow experiments 
with cash transfers but was recommending it at a later date. The mention 
of cash transfers has agitated Right to Food campaigners. They fear the 
government will force the states to switch to cash transfers prematurely, 
wasting the progress made in reforming the PDS. 
Present Version of the National Food Security Bill
On 22 December 2011, the National Food Security Bill was introduced in 
the parliament. Instead of talking in terms of BPL and APL groups, it uses 
a new language of 'priority' and 'general' categories. It does not specify 
clear criteria for what constitutes these two categories but prescribes 'not 
less than 46 per cent of the rural and 28 per cent of the urban population 
shall be designated priority households'; the combined coverage of prior-
ity and general households shall be 75 per cent of the rural population and 
50 per cent of the urban population. The PDS issue prices are speciﬁed as 
Rs. 3/2/1 for rice/wheat/millets (actually called 'coarse grains' in the bill) 
for priority households, and not more than half of the minimum support 
price for general households. In addition, there are special provisions for 
children, pregnant women, as well as lactating mothers. 
The issue of whether the food subsidy should be delivered as cash 
or kind is left vague, perhaps quite deliberately. In one short section of 
the bill (section 7), called 'PDS Reforms', the bill states that central and 
state governments 'shall endeavour to progressively undertake' various 
PDS reforms, including: computerization; leveraging 'Aadhaar' (UID) for 
India.indd   114 09-04-2013   12:53:36
_______________________________________________________________________ 115
________________________________ The Political Economy of Food Subsidy in India
unique identiﬁcation and proper targeting; full transparency of records; 
preference to public institutions or bodies in licensing of fair price shops; 
management of fair price shops by women or their collectives; diversi-
ﬁcation of commodities distributed under the PDS; full transparency of 
records; and 'introducing schemes such as cash transfer, food coupons 
or other schemes to the targeted beneﬁciaries in lieu of their foodgrain 
entitlements' as prescribed by the central government.
Thus, cash transfers are mentioned as a kind of reform. But the whole 
bill, including the obligations of the central government, is written in 
terms of the amounts of grain. This is quite problematic as one can 
imagine the possibility of a legal challenge in the future if a state opts 
for cash transfers (Economic Times 2011b; Hindustan Times 2012).
As for the reactions to the bill from the opposite sides of the debate, 
both sides are resigned to the idea that the government is not going to 
agree to increasing its ﬁscal burden. No modiﬁcation of the bill being 
urged at this stage requires the government to increase its outlay much 
more than the allocations in the present draft of the bill. However, 
many critics on the right who had been silent throughout the debate 
have now started voicing anxiety over the ﬁscal burden (Economic Times 
2011c; First Post 2011; Indian Express 2012). A common theme has been 
that there is far too much leakage and corruption in all government 
schemes and given that, the huge expenditure on food subsidies is 
wasteful. The result of this expression of ﬁscal anxiety in the media has 
been greater focus in the public debate on the efﬁciency of the methods 
of implementation. 
Among the active participants in the debate on the bill, both sides—
those who favour cash transfers and those opposed to the idea of cash 
transfers—have now formed a united front in opposing the idea of try-
ing to identify two categories of the poor, 'general' and 'priority'. As the 
bill stands now, the state governments will engage in this identifying 
exercise according to the guidelines laid out by the central government. 
No clear criteria are laid out in the bill itself. There is consensus among 
the active participants in the debate on the provisions in the bill that, 
given the failure of targeting under the present system, it is futile to 
try the same again under the new system. They suggest that instead 
of differentiating among the poor in two categories, treat them as one 
group and divide the total allotment equally among them. In other 
words, the idea is to identify the more easily identiﬁable group—the 
non-poor—that is, the top 25 per cent who would be excluded from 
any subsidy, and spread the subsidy equally among the rest. What this 
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would mean is that the households that get classiﬁed as the priority 
sector and would have received 35 kgs of grain per household would 
then receive only 25 kgs of grain. Of course, the households classiﬁed 
as the general sector would receive 25 kgs instead of 15 kgs. On paper, 
this looks like short-changing the poorest. However, in practice, there is 
no targeting system in India that would correctly differentiate between 
the poorest and the slightly less poor. When three-quarters of Indians 
live on less than US$2 a day, it is hard to argue that those under the 
general category do not need a food subsidy. It is clearly wasteful to 
engage in this exercise of identifying different levels of poverty. This 
logic united both sides of the debate in organizing another joint letter 
to the prime minister urging him to scrap these two categories and to 
simplify the exercise of targeting (Economic Times 2012). It remains to be 
seen whether the government modiﬁes the bill accordingly.
It is curious that when the logic for extinguishing the two categories 
appears so compelling, the government would still have this sort of 
targeting in the draft of the bill that it introduced in the parliament. 
There seems to be a perception that the Congress Party strategists are 
worried that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the opposition party, 
would exploit the fact that the government has betrayed the promise 
to the poorest by reducing their subsidized allocation from 35 kgs to 
25 kgs per household. Somehow there is no accounting here that in the 
bargain many households who would have received only 15 kgs per 
households would now receive 25 kgs per household. Also, simplifying 
the targeting mechanism would reduce the exclusion error substantially 
and would incline a chunk of the electorate to vote for the ruling party. 
Two things about Indian politics are revealed by this perception that 
a seeming betrayal of the promise on paper would be politically more 
costly than the certainty of bad implementation later. They are, ﬁrst, the 
short term is deemed more important than the long term, and second, 
tokenism has more currency than performance. However, it is possible 
that the voters' expectations are changing and that they are becoming 
more demanding in terms of performance; and if so, it would be a grave 
political miscalculation for the government not to simplify the bill to 
ensure better implementation.
 The most serious political problem for the bill is likely to be strong 
opposition by state governments. The central government obligation is 
to provide the resources to the state governments and after that, deliv-
ery and distribution issues are all presumed to be the responsibility of 
the state governments. The central government speciﬁes the number of 
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poor in two different categories in each state as well as the criteria for 
identiﬁcation in each category, and yet, identifying the households in 
each category is the responsibility of the state governments. In short, the 
decision-making is highly centralized and is divorced from the agency 
that would implement the decisions. 
As one would expect, there is a great deal of variation in bureaucratic 
competence, social capital, the extent of poverty and the level of cor-
ruption across the country. What works in Tamil Nadu may not work 
in Bihar and vice-versa. It is not surprising therefore that several states 
that have already embarked upon experiments with different ways of 
delivering the food subsidy have protested against the idea that the 
central government could dictate the details of how to deliver the food 
subsidy. Moreover, some states (e.g., Tamil Nadu, Bihar and West 
Bengal) have protested that the central government has assumed the 
authority to specify the coverage. The central government, of course, 
has no objection to the states widening the coverage as long as they use 
their own resources for the extra coverage.
A good solution for a possible impasse between the centre and the 
states is to allow the states to devise their own delivery mechanisms as 
long as they do not ask for extra resources from the centre. Dictates by 
the centre would be rejected by the states but the central government 
would certainly assert its right to determine the amount of resources 
it devotes to the food subsidy. We believe that ﬁnally when the dust 
settles, the outcome will be state ﬂexibility in choosing the delivery 
mechanism within the budget allotted by the centre.
 We will speculate on what we see as the future of food security in 
India. But ﬁrst we should discuss the role of community, an argument 
that has inﬂuenced this debate.
Role of Community
As mentioned before, many (though not all) civil society activists have 
come to put their faith in the community to check local corruption. This 
is partly because they have lost faith in the ability and willingness of the 
government bureaucracy to police itself. At the same time, they want to 
stay away from technological solutions to resolving social problems. In 
part, this comes from deep suspicion of the proﬁt-motivated corporate 
sector that would be the supplier of the technology, and in part from a 
basic belief in small village communities governing themselves as an 
ideal to strive for in a true democracy. It is on this romantic notion of the 
self-governing village community that we would like to comment. 
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India is a very diverse country. Social dynamics differ in different 
states. A recent study conducted in Maharashtra (Anderson, Francois & 
Kotwal 2011), based on a survey of 9,000 households from 300 villages, 
would cast a shadow on one's faith in the ability of local communities 
to help themselves. It shows that despite all the indicators signalling a 
well-functioning village democracy, the local elites run the village in 
their own interests. Poverty alleviation schemes are blocked and wages 
are kept low through long-standing patron–client relationships. Tradi-
tional hierarchical structures are manifested through modern formal 
democratic structures, sabotaging the progressive schemes of the central 
government. Farm workers and small farmers are beholden to the high-
caste (Maratha) farmers as they take consumption contingency loans 
and get access to Maratha-dominated trader networks. It makes them 
political allies of the Maratha farmers in the village elections enabling 
the traditional hierarchies to continue to hold sway. It is difﬁcult to 
imagine, under these circumstances, how a community will check local 
corruption through social audits and community spirit.
Not all civil society groups have this faith in local communities. 
Ashwini Kulkarni, the Director of an NGO active in rural Maharashtra 
called Pragati Abhiyan (Indian Express, 15 August 2009), has argued 
very persuasively that what we need is a well-designed management 
system with appropriate use of information technology. She believes 
that the behaviour of villagers as well as the bureaucrats is very much 
dependent on the detection and enforcement mechanisms that exist in 
the system. While doing a comparative study of the implementation of 
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act pro-
grammes in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh, she found that the key 
to understanding the vastly superior performance in Andhra Pradesh 
was the superior management system and an appropriate use of IT to 
streamline wage payments in Andhra Pradesh. She believes that the 
community behaviour is different in the two states as a result.
How effective community organization would be will vary across 
different communities and different states. It would be a mistake to take 
that as a generic solution. The use of better management systems and 
information technology cannot help but improve the outcomes once a 
certain minimum level of infrastructure becomes available.
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The Future
Given the main players in the food security debate, and given the situa-
tion at present, what course should we realistically expect on India's food 
security front? We feel that one signiﬁcant player that has provided the 
ideological platform to launch the food security bill, namely the NAC, 
will ﬁnd its inﬂuence coming to an end as the bill has been introduced in 
the parliament. On the other hand, the state governments that have been 
fairly dormant so far are likely to ﬂex their muscles and try to get some 
of the draconian restrictions that the present draft has placed on their 
freedom relaxed. It is not likely that the central government will budge 
on their allotment of Rs. 945 million for the total food subsidy bill. Any 
adjustments that the government agrees to will most likely have to ﬁt in 
this overall budget. For example, if the government agrees to increase 
the coverage, they may do it while reducing the per person subsidy. 
The central government is committed to the UID project; it is one of 
their 'blue chip' projects and they regard it as their legacy. The project 
will not have served its purpose unless it can be used to disburse ben-
eﬁts such as food subsidies. This makes us believe that at some point 
once the infrastructure is in place, cash transfers will arrive perhaps 
not simultaneously across India, but in a trickle. A state like Bihar that 
is already keen on switching to cash transfers will try it out ﬁrst and if 
the experiment is a success, it will be replicated elsewhere.
As far as farmers are concerned, we do not envisage export bans being 
lifted because international prices do ﬂuctuate a lot and the government 
will be reluctant to let the spikes in the international prices disrupt their 
budget plans. Thus, even if cash transfers arrive, it is unlikely that the gov-
ernment will allow international prices to dictate domestic prices in India 
as the food subsidy is such a large part of the government budget.
The key development for food security is, in fact, improvements in 
agricultural productivity, and yet, this has been conspicuous by its 
absence in the debate. We are afraid that this most important driver of 
poverty will remain as a non-controversial suggestion in every draft 
and will not be followed up, thus jeopardizing all future arrangements 
to eliminate poverty. 
Ashok Kotwal is a professor in the Department of Economics at the University 
of British Columbia. Milind Murugkar works with Pragati Abhiyan, a non-
governmental organization in the Indian state of Maharashtra. Bharat Ramaswami 
is a professor in the Planning Unit of the Indian Statistical Institute in Delhi.
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NOTES
1  This is not to say that there are no doubts or scepticism about welfare programmes. 
For instance, politicians have been concerned about the impact of public works 
projects (which are undertaken under the employment guarantee act) on the 
availability of farm labour. Similarly, there are apprehensions about the cost of 
the food security bill. Neither of these reservations questions the need for welfare 
programmes. 
2  Here we will focus only on food grains as they are the main food items and constitute 
the central issues in the food security debate, although other items such as sugar, 
edible oil and kerosene are also available in the fair price shops.
3  These ﬁgures are derived from Table 1 of Ramaswami and Murugkar (2012).
4  Jha and Ramaswami (2012) examine the workings of the PDS in India based on the 
data in the Consumption Expenditure schedule of the 61st round (2004-2005) of the 
National Sample Survey.
5  For a detailed discussion of this point, see Jha and Ramaswami (2012).
6  At the height of the socialist rhetoric in India's polity, the government attempted to 
nationalize the wheat trade in 1974—an experiment that failed spectacularly. 
7  Rice is sold as paddy that gets processed into rice at the rice mills. What the gov-
ernment announces is the Minimum Support Price (MSP) for paddy and not for 
rice. Also, the rice mills pay a levy. Wheat marketing is relatively simple. What the 
consumers buy in the market is what the farmers sell to the traders or to the govern-
ment and that is what the MSP is announced for.
8  For a formal account of the process, see Balakrishnan and Ramaswami (1995). 
9  In this context, Kotwal, Murugkar and Ramaswami (2011) observe the following: 
'Since the 1990s, with the exception of a single year, the government has bought 
more grain than it has sold through the PDS. Of course, the politics around the 
procurement price is a proximate reason. But there are other reasons too: most 
notably government miscalculation. At the higher levels of the government, there 
is immense paranoia about food shortages affecting the PDS. Politicians and bu-
reaucrats perceive the costs of insufﬁcient supplies but nobody is held accountable 
for excessive stocks and high prices. Predictably, the errors are in one direction. … 
Private trade will be displaced and so excess stocks in any one year continue to the 
next unless the cycle is broken by an exceptional event such as a drought'.
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